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FOUNTAIN OF Jus11CE. By John C.H. Wu. New York: Sheed and Ward. 
1955. Pp. ix, 287. $3.75. 
This book is concerned mainly with the influence of "natural law" and 
Christianity on the common law. 
The first part considers the leavening effect of "natural law" in English 
and American legal thinking. This influence is traced in Magna Carta, 
Bracton, More, St. Germain, Shakespeare, Coke, Holt, and Mansfield. The 
acceptance of common law in America and the vagaries of "natural law" 
during the process are followed through the Founding Fathers, nineteenth 
century individualism, the reaction to individualism and rationalism, and 
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finally through the trend toward personalism. The second part treats of the 
importance for law of Christ as the eternal law itself, as the Judge of judges, 
and the fountainhead of legal wisdom, as the Alpha and Omega of all law, 
and as grace's fulfillment of nature. 
Although most of the materials contained in the book have been pub-
lished before, as the author explains, there is an extrinsic unity that runs 
throughout. The citations that the author marshals in support of his posi-
tion furnish an interesting survey of judicial thinking on this subject over 
the past several hundred years. 
The author is eminently fitted to evaluate his data. He spans East and 
West. He was Chief Justice of the Provincial Court of Shanghai and is now 
a professor of law in this country. He is best known, perhaps, for his partic-
ipation in the well-known Wu-Holmes exchange of letters. His deep faith 
and delicate sensitivity have given him a broad tolerance and an ability to 
see agreements among men, as well as divergencies, whenever possible. 
There can be no question but that the author's main contention is well 
founded and it cannot but be salutary to have these facts placed before us 
again. American lawmen can become rootless like American youths-
scarcely knowing if they had grandparents, much less who they were. The 
law has not sprung full panoplied from the head of some Chief Justice. It 
has historical roots that are not only philosophical but also theological-
and these are almost exclusively Christian. 
There is, however, an important difference between the relation of 
Christian principles to the common law of England and to that of the 
United States. In England the common law grew up in a climate of Chris-
tian faith. And during the past four hundred years, there has been in 
England an "established" Christian religion that is recognized by law. In 
this country, the situation is different. American law recognizes no specific 
religion or code of morals. What Christian principles there are in the law 
are there either because they were already in the common law of England 
when it was adopted by the early colonies or because these principles reflect 
the religious beliefs of the people in general and legislators and judges in 
particular. 
The consequences of such a divergence deserves reflection. For if law 
recognizes no religious or moral code outside of itself, the only norm to 
which it can have recourse is what is acceptable to the majority of the 
people. What is acceptable to this majority, however, will be determined 
by their beliefs or lack of them in religious and moral matters. Ultimately 
Christian principles will be maintained in the law of the United States 
only through the beliefs of its individual citizens. American law can never 
pull itself up by its own legal but amoral bootstraps. 
Wu maintains that" ... while the Roman law was a deathbed convert 
to Christianity, the common law was a cradle Christian. . . . The very name 
'common law' was derived from the 'ius commune' of the canonists." (p. 65) 
Further, " ... it is no exaggeration to say that Anglo-American jurispru-
dence-the common law of England before the nineteenth century and the 
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common law of America since the eighteenth century-is permeated with 
the Spirit of Christianity to a greater degree than any other system of law 
except Canon Law." (p. 169) 
The effect of Christ on law is an aspect of the larger working of grace 
on nature. "But is it not significant that the two greatest systems of juris-
prudence in the world should both have been pupils in the school of 
Christ? These systems, the common law and the Continental law, furnish 
the most fascinating subject for comparison. They are similar in that both 
nature and grace have co-operated in their making. And yet there is an 
important difference. With the common law, which I have called a 'cradle 
Christian', natural wisdom and the Christian influence grew hand and 
hand in the course of the centuries. With the Continental law, on the 
other hand, natural wisdom has reached a high degree of maturity before 
grace began to work upon it. This is perhaps why the common law is 
instinctively Christian, while the Continental law is rationally Christian . 
. . . " (p. 229) 
The author is not giving a scientific analysis of law or "natural law" in 
this book. If he were, these issues would receive a more concise treatment. 
The essence of law, rather than being explained as "conformity to reason" 
(p. 219), would undoubtedly be identified as an ordination of reason 
(p. 12), that is, a directive judgment of the lawmaker. One is a prequisite 
condition of law, that is, it must be just or conformable to reason; the 
other is the essence of law itself. Again, in a fuller treatment, the differ-
ence between science and prudence would be brought out. Law, like 
ethics, is a science (pp. 198, 230) only if its content is limited to broad 
enough generalizations. Confronted with such specific problems as what 
percentage of a man's income should be taxed by legislation or what facts 
should be admitted as material in adjudication, law ultimately manifests 
its true nature-which is not science but prudence. 
One of the most needed clarifications today concerns what "natural 
law" is and how it differs from revelation. In a more complete handling 
of the subject, not only would "natural law" be centered on men's basic 
inclinations (p. 22), but an explanation could be given of what can be 
known from these inclinations that will furnish directives for man-made 
law and how they can be known. What law men want to know is what 
precisely are the "fundamental principles" concerning which "the peoples 
of all races and all stages of civilization are in substantial agreement'' and 
which "brings out the essential unity of mankind" so clearly? (p. 220) 
Only when these are painstakingly and candidly determined, can the 
foundation be laid for distinguishing between what is known from nature 
and what is known from revelation. For, although the content of each 
may ultimately be found to coincide, the manner in which they are known 
is the difference between reason and faith. 
The author has brought to our attention in this book a problem of the 
greatest importance to law. It is one that touches law's very nerve-the 
place of morals and religion in its content. We are much indebted to him 
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for a job well done. But, he says, (p. 208) "It is up to the younger genera-
tion of jurists to build up a truly fundamental philosophy of law by resort-
ing to the very fountains of the common law, the spirit and teaching of 
Christ. If we are teleologically minded, let us not satisfy ourselves with 
anything short of the end which is also the beginning, the Omega who is 
also the Alpha.'' 
Thomas E. Davitt, S.]. 
Associate Professor of Jurisprudence, 
Marquette University School of Law 
